Before discussing the development of the sociology of time, it is important to note the existence of a tendency to relativize “modern time” in various academic disciplines since the 19th century. Until the emergence of the sociology of time, modern science had naively assumed “modern time” as the only concept of time. However, it gradually became clear that this was not the only understanding of time. Scholars such as H. Bergson, E. Husserl, and M. Heidegger had already emphasized the importance of concepts such as “duration,” “internal time consciousness,” and “inherent temporality.” These concepts, which differ from the notion of “modern time” (also referred to as “spatialized time,” “objective time,” or “popular time concepts such as ‘now time’”), were positioned as the basis for the relativization of modern time [^3^].
The sociology of time also began its exploration of time by focusing on these alternative understandings of time, in line with the tendencies of contemporary academic disciplines. As pointed out by P. Sorokin and R. K. Merton, the starting point of the sociology of time was the recognition of the “accidental nature of Newtonian time [= ‘modern time’]” and the understanding that Newton’s conceptualization of time as “singular, infinitely divisible, and continuous” was not the only possible concept of time [^4^].
Various scholars have made similar observations [^Bergmann 1983; P